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1. Introduction
According to conventional wisdom, economic decision making was governed by a
tight hierarchical command structure in the former Soviet Union. The functioning of
the old socialist institutions was regulated and enforced by the government and the
Communist Party. Central planning of prices and output was the most important
economic feature of this system. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the now
independent CIS countries have step-by-step started to dismantle their socialist
institutional structure and to replace it by market type institution. Russia, the most
advanced CIS state, liberalised most consumer prices in 1992, and a bulk of
production decisions were delegated to the firm level. Nonetheless, a steep decline
of output and investment as well as the break-down of trade among CIS countries
suggest that Russia and the other CIS countries have - among other things - failed to
solve a number of difficult institutional problems. Some of these problems are briefly
sketched in the following section. It will then be shown that the difficulties with
institution building are deeply rooted in the legacy of the old socialist system. A major
common cause is the dissolution of command structures long before political and
economic transformation was on the agenda. Against this background, new
institutions cannot be build by simple copying western style democracies. It is
suggested in the final section that CIS countries will have to apply a more radical
approach.
* This paper reports research undertaken in a project on 'The Division of Labour Between CIS
Countries ..." which is conducted with financial support from the Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und
Halbach Foundation. The author is grateful to U. Hiemenz for his help in translating the institutional
economics'view into the framework of the project.2. Institutional Shortcomings
The by far hardest institutional constraint facing CIS countries is a rapidly growing
gap between the demand for legal protection of property and contracts and the
dismail supply of these services. The more resource allocation becomes subject to
the new market mechanisms, replacing the old administrative system, the more
urgent becomes a framework of contract and business laws rigorously enforced by
police and courts, if high (prohibitive)) transaction costs are to be avoided. The lack
of ah assured legal framework impedes the emergence of markets and results in ad
hoc arrangements between enterprises or between regional governments and
enterprises often involving barter trade, as well as in a waste of resources through
corruption or .private protection of property. These consequences are easily
observable in Russia and other CIS countries [DIW, IfW, IWH, 1993].
Very similar institutional reasons have contributed to the break-down of intra-CIS
trade [Michalopoulos, Tarr, 1992]. The former central planning system was only
partly replaced by trade agreements between the now independent states which has
caused .a host of legal and practical problems. To name only a few, there is little
across-border co-ordination of infra-structural facilities; customs procedures are
surrounded by tremendous uncertainties; and existing agreements as well as
contracts are even less enforceable among CIS countries than domestically
[Langharnmer, 1994]. The main constraint is, however, emerging from the absence
of a mutually agreed payments mechanism which would allow to settle balances in
intra-CIS trade. Such balances must arise since Russia is economically more
advanced than the other CIS countries and the for many CIS countries the only
supplier of raw materials and energy. Disputes over the settlement of accumulated
debts to Russia have resulted in a disruption of badly needed energy imports for
some CIS countries (in particular Ukraine).
The deadlock in the negotiations on a payments mechanism is rooted in the lack of a
universally accepted currencies over which CIS countries themselves would havecontrol. Monetary policies of all CIS countries including Russia are not credible and
hence, economic agents revert to barter trade or use foreign currencies. In both
cases, transaction costs are usually increased.
The institutional vacuum in the economic sphere is accompanied by a collapse of the
general state administration. Licenses, permits, safety and health controls as well as
other public services required for an orderly conduct of business relations are no
longer easily obtainable. The respective administrations have either ceased to
function at all, or the supply of these services became subject to a bargaining
process which entails uncertainty and delays as well as in many cases high costs.
The inherent efficiency losses tend to be even higher since many regulations were
inherited from the previous socialist system and do not fit into a market mechanism.
Nonetheless, such regulations are used by respective administrators as means of
generating additional income (rent-seeking).
These severe institutional deficiencies constitute a substantial danger for the
success of the transformation process. The complete failure of legal systems is a
problem, which does not only impede market transactions and increases transaction
costs but can undermine the very existence of the newly emerged states and
produce smuta or permanent turmoil. Compared to this failure, the danger of
monetary instability is not as terminal, because the population of the CIS has learned
to use all the other means of payments, ranging from different sorts of barter to
foreign hard currencies. But the failure to establish a reliable monetary system in the
CIS could produce long-term inefficiency and stagnation in a huge continent and
possibly become a major source of regional and world instability as well.
3. The Legacy of the Past
The failure to establish adequate institutions is not the result of lacking knowledge or
capabilities but rather reflects fundamental changes in the organisation of the Soviet
society which evolved since the late 1950s. The central hypothesis is that socialistcommand structures were gradually replaced by bargaining processes, thus
changing the rules for all social transactions. As elaborated elsewhere in greater
detail [Naishul, 1990], the Stalinist command structures-based on hierarchical
decision-making were no longer able to fulfil their tasks of overseeing and guiding all
aspects of economic and social life when the economy grew much more complex in
the aftermath of World War II. The inability of the highly centralised hierarchical
system to cope with the processing of enormous amounts of information and to
translate this information into detailed production quotas necessitated discretionary
decision-making at virtually all levels of the hierarchy, i.e. plan targets became
negotiable to some extent. In addition, the unavoidable loophoies of central planning
created a demand for horizontal relationships supplementing the hierarchical
subordination. Managers of firms without sufficient supplies of inputs entered into
direct contact with respective suppliers. Both in vertical and horizontal relationships,
goods and services were exchanged for favours or other goods and services in a
bargaining process. Thus, one may say that the strictly hierarchical system was
transformed into a bureaucratic or administrative market, as several Russian
scholars showed [Aven and Shironin, 1987; Belanovskii, 1991-92; Kaganskii, 1991,
1992; Konstantonov and Naishul, 1986; Kordonskii, 1986, 1991; Naishul, 1990;
Pavlenko 1989,1990; Rodnyi, verbal memo, 1981].
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This model of decision making processes in the former Soviet Union can be
characterised by three major types of social interactions. The first concerns the
bargaining relationship between subordinates and their superiors which involves a
vertical exchange of goods and services or favours for both public and private
purposes. By its very nature, vertical trading is carried out in an "unequal" fashion,
i.e. because of their statuses in the hierarchy superiors are in a better bargaining
position than their subordinates (Diagram 1 :(a). By contrast, horizontal trade among
people at a similar hierarchical level takes place on an equal footing and is therefore
more balanced as indicated in case (b) in Diagram 1. These horizontal relationships
include legal or ex post legalised transactions as well as illegal swaps of goods.andservices. And finally, there is trading with hierarchical statuses. Subordinates are
prepared to bid for better positions in the hierarchy to avail themselves of the
benefits of unequal vertical trade. This trade is complicated by the fact that bidders
do not operate in a single hierarchical but in a matrix system, i.e. a system of
intertwined hierarchies in governmental agencies and in the Party. Therefore, trading
of statuses may involve more than two parties, and each bargain can cut through
several hierarchical cones (Diagram 1 :(c)).
Diagram 1 ; Stylised Trading Relationships in the Bureaucratic System of the
Former Soviet Union
(c)
An institutional model with these characteristics has some interesting dynamic
properties which can shed light on the present institutional problems in CIS
countries. In the medium term, bargaining over statuses, between governmental
agencies and the Party, changes the hierarchies and the influence over the
appropriation of certain goods and services associated with each status. The matrix
system becomes more multifaceted and less manageable over time. More
importantly, however, trading of statuses means that the hierarchical system is
flattened and there is less dependence on superiors than in the old system. As a
result, the importance of vertical trade is diminished in favour of horizontal trade
which constitutes the backbone of any market economy. The fading of hierarchical
interdependencies of state institutions transformed e.g. government offices more andmore into sovereign firms engaging in market-type transactions with their
'customers'.
This process enlarged the customary rights of the managerial staff over the 'firm's'
property as well as the customary rights of employees over the terms of their
employment. An example for the latter may be the well-known informal non-
dismissed rules. Other implications of the model which are matched by what can
actually be observed in the Soviet Union, e.g. during the Perestroika period, include
a reduction in the supply of public goods. The global marketisation meant that state
institutions performed their duties only to the extent that they could directly benefit
either through financial rewards or access to rights over goods and services. Thus,
public" goods became private goods traded in respective markets. Even law
enforcement (legal violence) is subject to bargaining as anecdotal evidence
indicates.
If the above theory about the main features of institutional development in the
pretransformation era is correct, the legacy of the past has a tremendous impact on
the chances of establishing the necessary institutional framework for a market
economy. By destroying all the hierarchical systems, the Soviet Union was
dismantled at a stage when there was virtually no apparatus of state coercion left.
The existing state apparatus could not be used to build a new hierarchical system of
state coersion. Therefore, the founders of new states will not only have to create new
state institutions, but to re-invent new subordinate relations segregated from
bargaining. This appears to be a heroic task which can hardly be solved in a short
period of time. In the following, the implications of the legacy of the past are
demonstrated for crucial areas of institution building described in Section 2.
4. Legal Norms and Customary Rights
The establishment of a legal framework conducive to market transactions is a major
task to be accomplished in the transformation process. The analysis presented in theprevious section has demonstrated that the basis for building new legal institutions is
extremely weak.
It is also important that in the system of central planning contract and property laws
were virtually non-existent. On the one hand, citizens of the Soviet Union previously
had no private property, and civil conflicts about the very small personal property
were extremely rare. On the other hand, all the resources were allocated to firms
(enterprises) by administrative bodies, and they were resolving all the arising serious
conflicts by administrative means. The legal system when applied to enterprises was
aimed at imposing regulations and not at resolving civil conflicts, and, therefore, had
only few norms. Existing regulative legal norms were suited to facilitate bureaucratic
control, and most of them cannot be used in a market environment.
The legal system when applied to citizens was aimed at and had norms for the
punishment of crimes against 'personality', personal and state property. The real
purpose of the legal system was to protect the state against the population, and not
to preserve individual rights. This can be illustrated by the fact that theft of state
property was punished much more severely then theft of personal property.
1
Another impediment for the establishment of a new legal system is the multiplicity of
powerful customary rights that were inherited from the bureaucratic market system
[Naishul, 1993]. One important example of these customary rights is the above
mentioned managerial control over enterprises. Another very vivid example is
ownership rights of tenants over state apartments in which they live. These rights
came into effect de facto as early as in the late 1960s and de jure in the early 1980s.
In order to be effective or even simply viable, any future legal system will have to
recognise and incorporate a majority of these rights. However, these rights are
informal, and in most cases hidden until a conflict arises. This means that the
1 Until very recently thievery of state property could (and was) punished up to death penalty while a
maximum sentence for thievery of personal property was five years [Ugolovniy Kodeks RSFSR,
Criminal Code of Russian Federation, 1990].8
legalisation of conflicts over customary rights is the only method of getting correct
information about these hidden but powerful rights.
Under these circumstances, most of new legal norms can hardly be created by
parliamentary vote or government decree. Rather, any future legal reform will have
to pave the way for a formulation of legal norms at the grass-roots level which takes
into account the existing conflicts over the possession and use of property. The
solution may be a 'liberalisation of courts' which enables low courts to change norms
of the written law contradicting customary ones or to create new legal norms. Such
decisions would have to be adopted by high-level courts before they come into force.
The legal system, reformed in this way, may become a Russian analogue of the
Anglo-Saxon precedent system, i.e. few written laws and many case-by-case
courtroom decisions.
5. Law Enforcement
Law and order in the CIS countries are suffering not only from the lack of appropriate
legal norms and non-corrupt apparatuses. The stumbling stone for many countries is
a deficit of legitimacy of the state to exercise legal violence against people violating
excepted laws. Presently, governments of most countries appear to be unable to
break the resistance of special interest groups. In order to do this in a democratic
country where the ultimate power belongs to the people, a homogeneous reaction of
the society to the most important social matters, i.e. a national consensus, is a
necessary precondition for the establishment of a strong legitimate power [Gellner,
1983; Lvin, 1991].
Several scholars [Gellner, verbal memo, 1993; Lvin, 1992] consider the modern
Russian population as highly homogeneous, if some ethnically entirely different
enclaves, like Chechnica, are excluded. That means, that in principle a strong
government could be established in Russia. This homogeneity is, however, a more
difficult issue in some other CIS states. Ukraine, for example, consists of at leastthree major territories, differing according to language and religion: Russian-
speaking Orthodox Eastern Ukraine, Ukrainian-speaking Orthodox Central Ukraine
and Uniat Ukrainian-speaking Western Ukraine. Kazahkstan is almost equally
divided between a Russian and a Kazahk part. These ethnical segmentations within
CIS countries appear to be difficult to overcome as severe conflicts and sometimes
even^civil wars in several regions of the former Soviet Union show. If no mechanism
for national consensus building can be found a solution for the enforcement problem
cannot easily be envisaged, and the whole transformation process is endangered. In
the extreme, major changes in the political map of the CIS may have to precede
successful economic reforms.
National homogeneity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the emergence
of legitimate power. The policy of communist despotism was to strengthen itself via
forced alienation of individuals. For several generations communist power destroyed
all attempts of horizontal co-operation among individuals. As a result, the social
structure (in the Slavic republics at least) mostly consisted of a large number of very
small overlapping "circles", i.e. groups of people knowing and trusting each other.
Only in these groups a social discipline was preserved and real authorities existed.
These circles formed the mighty social kol-shuga or das Panzerhemd which
detached the society to a great extent from whatever any government was doing.
They were responsible for maintaining order in Russia during a period of dramatic
changes and extremely weak government which characterised the transformation
process. However, the key problem is to establish new institutions as powerful as
these circles, but extending to much larger groups of people. All the elected bodies
(perhaps with the exception of the Presidency) do so far not possess any legitimacy
and are, therefore, unable to set up an executive apparatus which could guarantee
law and order.
Instead, the huge gap between demand and supply of legal protection produced high
incentives for private enforcement of private laws. In the above mentioned circles the10
discipline is high enough to solve most conflicts. That is why Russian businessmen
are doing well when operating within these circles. This lowers their transaction costs
but also produces enormous economic inefficiencies by greatly curtailing the choice
of partners. Whenever they leave their respective circles they have to resort to the
services of private protective agencies or to set up their own protective agencies.
2
Even segments of the Russian state police are often used as private protective
agencies. Independent of the moral judgement on private justice, this 'industry
1 is
now the only working instrument that is able to solve legal problems currently
associated with economic transactions. These agencies' services are, however,
imposing extremely heavy costs on all commercial activities. And furthermore, even
the best protective agency is not able to operate e.g. all over Russia. Even more
problems are emerging in cross-border trade, especially when two countries belong
to different cultures. .
The advancement of market relations makes a new system of law and order a key
political requirement. The existing situation has become intolerable both for big
business which is at best partially protected by its expensive private armies and for
small businesses and rank-and-file people which are subject to exploitation by
criminal organisations. This makes the formation of new legitimate centres of power
a matter of highest priority in Russia and in the other CIS states. Only on the basis pf
such social institutions legitimate law enforcement agencies can be established. How
such a transformation may be achieved is taken up in the last Section.
6. Monetary Issues
The institutional vacuum in the socialist era not only destroyed the legal framework
of CIS-countries but also had serious implications for the ability of these countries to
conduct monetary policies appropriate for market transactions. The collapse of the
The big financial group "Most" is said to have as much as 800 armed people for its own defence.11
central authorities transformed the all-union bureaucratic market into a multiplicity of
diminutive soviet unions trading with each other in the way the COMECON did, i.e.
by exchanging a list of products of one region for the list of products for another
region. 'Foreign trade' organisations of the region were special regional government
division, regional supply-and-procurement agencies (former Gossnab) and special
associations of enterprises. This regional barter market, although inefficient, was at
j • • ••••• ' -
the same time a decentralised system and to an important extent independent from
political decisions of the central authorities.
This situation dramatically changed when the Gaidar government came to power. In
the monetary field, the government attempted to impose on the economy a kind of
exchange mechanism considered optimal rather than to provide means of payment
which would assist trade with goods and services. These seriously hampered
traditional ways of bargaining, deteriorated trade within Russia and produced a
heavy blow to inter-CIS trade because of the dissolution of the ruble zone.
Except for the barter commodities, the only 'real' money before the reforms was cash
money which traditionally served the two most monetised sectors of economy:
consumer and labour markets. During the socialist years (excluding wars and
Perestroika) a sufficiently tough monetary policy was exercised towards the supply of
cash money.
3 Cash money was excepted all over the Soviet Union as a universal
means of payment. Alongside with cash money and cash money accounts,
convertible on demand or almost on demand into cash, there existed several types
of other accounts. In contrast to real cash money, this beznalichnye or non-cash
accounts were designed as instruments of supervision. As far as non-cash money
were concerned, a special mechanism was implemented by local branches of the
central bank, automatically providing credits covering all non-cash money costs of
3 Although cash money supply until 1985 is still a classified data (!), the statement can be proved
indirectly by the fact,.that average salary in the Soviet Union between 1960 and 1985 was
increasing at 6 per cent average annual rate [Narodnoe khozyaistvo, 1985]. This implies that cash
money supply was very modest and was very carefully watched.12
plan-authorised procurement. That actually meant that the local branches could
issue non-cash money according to local demand [Spravochnik, 1990].
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union there were two options for the reform of the
monetary policy. One was to liberalise financial markets completely; the other to
establish a western type banking system with severe governmental controls. In the
first case, i.e. a kind of free-banking solution,
4 the monetary system would be
commercial and to a large extent politically neutral, operating in the manner of
international business firms [Hayek, 1974]. In the second case the functioning of
financial markets would be linked to the particular political structure of each country
and therefore divided into different geographical areas. A fully liberalised monetary
system would make all the newly emerging, weak national governments non-
responsible for the amount of money(s) in circulation. In a western type banking
system each national government would have to use all the legitimacy it has to fight
demands for easy money for years to come.
In light of the above observations about the extremely weak legitimacy of newly
emerging governments in CIS countries, prospects for the monetary systems and
thus, inter-republican trade look gloomy. Russia, the most advanced country, has
opted for a two-tier banking system which was never fully implemented because
strong interest groups pressure prevented the establishment of stringent controls on
credit expansion and the supply of cash rubles. Therefore, the Russian government
is carrying out a never-ending struggle with inflation which reminds of old Brezhnev
battles for good harvest or fulfilment of plan indicators. Most other countries of the
CIS are in an even worse position. Monetary stabilisation through a tougher
4 This option implies that there would be no single national currency at least as far as Russia is
concerned. Everybody were free to use any currencies varying from dollars to rubles or gasoline
contracts. The cash ruble became a currency of the privatised former central bank. Its local
branches in any country, privatised as well, were free to issue their own non-cash money under
their own brand names or to merge with others. All the banks would join the trading of different
non-cash moneys. • .13 Bibh
ts f*«r
monetary stance of the Central Bank fails. This means that the present monetary
system of the CIS may jeopardise trade for many years to come.
7. Conclusions
\rjr\ virtually all CIS countries, the transformation process from central planning to a
market mechanism is plagued by severe adjustment recessions and a collapse of
intraCIS trade. The underlying rigidities and market imperfections are not failures of
the market mechanism but failures to establish an appropriate institutional framework
suited for these countries. This failure is not rooted in a lack of knowledge or
capabilities; it rather reflects deep-seated deficiencies in the organisational structure
of society. 70 years of socialism left a phenomenal legacy in the former Soviet
Union. Hierarchical relationships were largely replaced by bargaining processes,
thus eroding the backbone of any society, i.e. an institutional framework within which
a national consensus can be formulated. As a substitute, the society has organised
itself in overlapping circles which discipline and protect their members. This leads to
the conclusion that with this existing institutional structures of their societies CIS
countries are unable to establish the legal norms, law enforcement and a monetary
regime required for a smooth functioning of market transactions.
This analysis demands to take extraordinary decisions in the reform process of CIS
countries. A mere imitation of institutions as they are common in western market
economies cannot remedy the deficiencies in the organisational structure of
societies. The weakness of the parliamentary system in most CIS countries is a clear
indication of such a failed attempt.
But what are the alternatives? In theory, there seem to be two approaches available.
One is the emergence of a so-called 'stationary bandit* [Ohlson, 1993] which means
the creation of authoritarian rule to substitute for the inability of societies to enforce
their own rules. The other approach suggested by Buchanan [1975] envisages a
recreation of rules and institutions through private initiative. The basic idea is that14
self-organisation in an institutional vacuum imposes high costs on all members of the
society. It would, therefore, be in the best self-interest of everyone to join like-minded
people and accept certain common rules which would help to reduce transaction
costs. In this process, institutional subordination and social decision making would
be gradually built up from the grassroots level.
If this approach would be chosen it had far-reaching implications. New organisational
structures for the society can only emerge when the old, inappropriate structures are
completely dismantled. This condition required to speed up deregulation and abolish
old institutions to an extent unknown in western market economies [Naishul, 1990,
1994]. A few of the required actions have been briefly hinted at in Sections 4-6. They
would include a privatisation of government institutions, a new role for courts and the
de facto privatisation of the monetary regime. It will, however, require further
research to develop more detailed and more substantive reform proposals for
different policy areas.15
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